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Why Is Betamax an Anachronism
in the Digital Age?
Erosion of the Sony Doctrine and Indirect Copyright
Liability of Internet Technologies
By Jiarui Liu*
The copyright bar widely recognizes
Universal City Studios v. Sony Corporation of
America ("Sony") as a landmark of indirect
copyright liability.2 When copyright holders
cried doom for the advent of a new commu-
nications technology, namely the Betamax
Video Tape Recorder ("VTR"), the Supreme
Court decided to preserve the delicate balance
between important competing interests: the
need to retain incentives to intellectual cre-
ation in works of authorship and the desire to













later proved the wisdom of such holdings.6
Twenty years later, confronted with
another edge-cutting information technology
featuring digitalization and the Internet, copy-
right holders once again resort to an indirect
copyright theory of liability against technol-
ogy providers, 7 such as those operating elec-
tronic bulletin board systems ("BBS") or peer-
to-peer file sharing systems.9 Accordingly, the
Sony case unsurprisingly has become one of
the most frequently quoted cases by courts
of Internet-related copyright cases. However,
"Although the entertainment
industry now appears to regard
peer-to-peer file sharing as
unprecedented and outrageous
piracy, it must have had no less a
strong feeling toward Betamax
VTRs twenty years ago."
rect copyright
liability.3 On the other hand, by analogizing
the "staple article of commerce" theory in the
Patent Act,4 it refrained from imposing indi-
rect copyright liability on providers of copy-
ing technologies that may be used to infringe
copyright on the grounds that the technology
is also capable of substantial noninfringing
uses.5 A prosperous home entertainment
market, from which both copyright holders
and VTR manufacturers greatly benefited,
it appears that the essence of the Sony doc-
trine appears is not followed faithfully all of
the time. Some lower courts have conjured
various formulas to narrow, or even preclude,
the application of the Sony doctrine, includ-
ing the dichotomies of contributory infringe-
ment versus vicarious liability, products ver-




This Article aims to examine whether,
as some courts indicate, the Sony doctrine is
largely irrelevant in cyberspace. If the answer
is no, how should courts properly apply the
Sony doctrine to protect copyright holders' le-
gitimate interests and further the innovation
and prosperity of Internet technologies? This
Article argues that the Sony doctrine should be
given the widest application possible and not
be subject to any preconceived formula. In the
digital age, the test of "capable of substantial
noninfringing uses" is still well suited to advance
the ultimate objective of copyright law contem-
plated by the Supreme Court as well as by the
Constitution: "promot[ing] the Progress of Sci-
ence and useful Arts."
10
Section I begins with a historic brief of
the Sony case, the real image of which might
have been blurred by fragmentary or even
manipulative quotations in numerous subse-
quent cases. Section II analyzes some lower
courts' readings of the Sony doctrine, elucidates
their misapplication of the doctrine, and pro-
poses a better application. Section III discusses
the relevance of the Sony doctrine in the digital
age and argues that it should remain one of the
most favorable and forceful safeguards for the
general public's interests in technology innova-
tion and free flow of information. Section IV
summarizes the main points of this Article and
presents several policy recommendations.
I. Revisiting the Sony Legacy
Although the entertainment industry
now appears to regard peer-to-peer file sharing
as unprecedented and outrageous piracy, it
must have had an equally strong feeling toward














businesses.12 Jack Valenti, the president of
Motion Pictures Association, alleged that "the
VTR is to the American film producer and the
American public as the Boston Strangler is to
the woman alone."'
13
Consequently, Universal and Walt
Disney, the copyright holders of works in cer-
tain television programs, did not wait long to
sue Sony, the manufacturer of Betamax VTRs,
based on contributory infringement and vicari-
ous liability theories, claiming that Sony sold
products which enabled consumers to infringe
the plaintiffs' copyrights.14 The District Court
for the Central District of California denied any
of the relief that the plaintiffs sought. It held
that most consumers used VTRs for the pur-
pose of time-shifting,' 5 which was a fair use un-
der the copyright law. 6 Furthermore, the Dis-
trict Court held that Sony could not be held
contributorily and vicariously liable for copy-
right infringement even if the home use of a
VTR was considered an infringing use. It rea-
soned that imposing liability on staple articles
of commerce that have substantial
noninfringing uses went beyond precedent and
arguably judicial management. 7
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit entirely reversed and remanded
the case to the District Court to determine re-
lief. The Court of Appeals held that consum-
ers' home recordings did not constitute fair
use.18 It also rejected the argument about the
exemption for staple articles of commerce. 9
Since Betamax VTRs were manufactured, ad-
vertised, and sold for the primary purpose of
reproducing television programming, and vir-
tually all such programming was copyrighted
material, the Court of Appeals found them un-
suited for substantial noninfringing uses.20 Ul-
"Although VTRs could be used for
such an infringing purpose as
making tape libraries, they could
also be used for authorized taping
of television programs or for such a
fair use as time-shifting"
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timately, the Supreme Court endorsed the hold-
ings of the District Court and rejected the plain-
tiffs' copyright infringement claims. 21 It first
indicated that the Copyright Act did not ex-
pressly provide for vicarious or contributory
liability for copyright infringement, but that the
absence of such a provision did not preclude
liability.22 Then the Supreme Court, by turn-
ing to the Patent Act as the closest analogue,
23
adopted the "staple article of commerce" theory
as the appropriate means of evaluating claims
of vicarious liability or contributory infringe-
ment. The doctrine holds that "the sale of copy-
ing equipment, like the sale of other articles of
commerce, does not constitute contributory
infringement if the product is widely used for
legitimate, unobjectionable purposes. Indeed,
it need merely be capable of substantial
noninfringing uses." 24 Although VTRs could
be used for such an infringing purpose as mak-
ing tape libraries, they could also be used for
authorized taping of television programs or for
such a fair use as time-shifting. The latter two
noninfringing uses were substantial enough to
absolve Sony of any indirect copyright liabil-
ity.25 The Supreme Court also articulated the
policy underpinning of such a holding: "The
staple article of commerce doctrine must strike
a balance between a copyright holder's legiti-
mate demand for effective - not merely sym-
bolic - protection of the statutory monopoly,
and the rights of others freely to engage in sub-
stantially unrelated areas of commerce."
26
II. Misapplication of the Sony
Doctrine in Recent Internet-related
Cases
In the recent decade, the traditional
copyright landscape has been drastically
changed by the advent of digital technology.
Digital technology empowers average consum-
ers to make near-perfect unauthorized copies
of copyrighted works and distribute such cop-
ies globally merely with several clicks on com-
puter keyboards.27 Therefore, it would be pro-
hibitively expensive for copyright holders to
police all the computer users in the privacy of
their homes or initiate lawsuits against thou-
sands of infringers one by one.28 Even though
copyright enforcement actions against indi-
vidual infringers are practically feasible, the lim-
ited financial capabilities of most infringers
would render ostensible litigation victories
mostly futile.29 Moreover, the scenario of big
conglomerates versus small individuals would
probably result in negative publicity, which
could consequently undermine copyright in-
dustries' customer base and political sympa-
thy.0 For those practical and political concerns,
copyright holders find themselves chasing di-
rect copyright infringements largely in vain,
with every end user being a potential infringer.
To surmount such difficulties arising
from digital technology, many right holders
seek to change their enforcement strategies.
They, inter alia, increasingly assert indirect li-
abilities of technology providers who make end
user infringements possible and who tend to
be more readily identifiable and have deeper
pockets. Facing this new wave of claims for
indirect copyright liability, courts heavily rely
on the seminal Sony case for guidance on how
to reconcile the relationship between copyright
protection and technological advances. How-
ever, among a variety of applications by lower
courts, a few, including MAPHIA,
3 Netcom, 32
and Napster,33 were arguably inconsistent with
the essence of the Sony doctrine. This section
will discuss why those cases should be consid-
ered diversions from the teachings of the Su-
preme Court, and meanwhile explore the origi-
nal implications of the Sony doctrine.
A. Does the Sony Doctrine
Apply to Contributory In-
frin ement as Well as Vicari-
ous -Liability?
Indirect copyright liability basically con-
sists of two branches: contributory infringe-
ment and vicarious liability. In addition to the
occurrence of at least one direct infringement,34
each of these two theories requires two addi-
tional prongs. Contributory infringement arises
when the defendant "induces, causes or mate-
rially contributes to the infringing conduct of
another," with actual or constructive knowledge
of the infringing activity.35 Vicarious liability
arises when the defendant possesses "the right
and ability to supervise the infringing conduct"
and has "an obvious and direct financial inter-
est in the exploitation of copyrighted materi-
als. ' 36 More often than not, contributory in-
fringement and vicarious liability are jointly al-
















"...it would be prohibitively
expensive for copyright holders to
police all the computer users in the
privacy of their homes or initiate
lawsuits against thousands of
infringers one by one."
for vicarious copyright infringement," since
doctrines of vicarious liability "were not before
the Supreme Court. '38 In other words, the Sony
doctrine provides a defense only to contribu-
tory infringement, not to vicarious liability.
However, a more cautious reading of the Sony
case may not lead to such a conclusion. As in-
dicated by many commentators, 39 the Supreme
Court used the terms "vicarious liability" and
"contributory infringement" interchangeably
throughout the opinion, in a generic sense
which was broad enough to cover both
branches of indirect copyright liability.4" For
example, the Supreme Court stated that "vi-
carious liability is imposed in virtually all areas
of the law, and the concept of contributory in-
fringement is merely a species of the broader
problem of identifying the circumstances in
which it is just to hold one individual account-
able for the actions of another."41 More impor-
tantly, the Supreme Court even explicitly indi-
cated in a footnote that, given that "the lines
between direct infringement, contributory in-
fringement and vicarious liability are not clearly
drawn...the reasoned analysis of respondents'
unprecedented contributory infringement
claim necessarily entails consideration of argu-
ments and case law which may also be for-
warded under the other labels."42
Aside from this express language in the
Sony opinion, the policy underpinning of the
Sony doctrine also supports its application to
vicarious liability. The Supreme Court made it
clear that copyright monopolies could not be
unduly extended to block the "wheels of com-
merce."43 However, the Napster court's denial
of the Sony defense to vicarious liability, coupled
with its heavy reliance on the widely criticized
Fonovisa test,44 may virtually expose all Internet
technologies to vicarious liability. Under the
Fonovisa test, the first prong of vicarious liabil-
ity, namely "financial interest," can be satisfied
by showing that the infringing uses of a tech-
nology "act as a draw for customers," or in other
words, "enhance the attractiveness of a
venue."45 This interpretation basically renders
this prong superfluous, since even household
articles like a knife and paper can also arguably
have some "draw" to potential wrongdoers due
to their capability of misuse. The second prong,
the "right and ability to supervise direct infring-
ers," can be established by relying on findings
that the defendant reserved its right to block
its service to any consumer at will.46 However,
almost all software providers may legally reserve
such termination rights via shrink-wrap or
click-wrap license, 47 and due to the high ma-
nipulability of computer software, may exer-
cise such rights without substantial technical
difficulty.
48
The looming clouds of vicarious liabil-
ity will coerce Internet technology providers to
extensively monitor and censor online content
distributions.49 Because of the complexity of
copyright doctrines 50 and the sheer volume of
digital transmission, any policing of online
copyright infringement must involve consid-
erable financial and human resources.5' Tech-
nology providers will therefore suffer a signifi-
cant increase in their operation costs. As to
small Internet start-ups, such a burden may
even constitute an unsurpassable barrier for
market access. 52 Furthermore, since the Sony
doctrine has released most analog technologies
from indirect copyright liability, the threat of
vicarious liability will be tantamount to a me-
dium-discriminative burden on all digital tech-
nologies. The Internet industry as a whole will
Spring 2005
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be severely hampered by this unequal, unprec-
edented treatment. In addition, the harsh im-
position of vicarious liability on technology pro-
viders may also conflict with the ultimate pub-
lic interests promoted by copyright law. On
one hand, it would raise private censorship to
such a socially undesirable level that it would
place an undue constraint on information ac-
cess and free speech 3 in cyberspace. On the
other hand, ensuing intense investigations can
potentially cause excessive intrusion into con-
sumers' privacy.
54
B. Does the Sony Doctrine
Apply to Products as Well as
Services?
Sega Enterprises, Limited v. MAPHIA, one
of the earliest Internet-related copyright cases,
failed to apply the Sony doctrine to continuing
BBS services and only analyzed the
noninfringing uses associated with freestand-
ing software copiers." Likewise, the district
court in Napster tried to distinguish the Sony
case on the ground that the defendant here ex-
ercised "on-going control" over its service by
retaining the ability to block access to subscrib-
ers, while Sony controlled its users only at the
point of sale.5 6 This holding obviously endorsed
the plaintiff's assertion that "Napster is not the
same, legally, as the VTR, because it is a service,
rather than an 'article of commerce,' a prod-
uct." 17
direct infringement, to which the Sony doctrine
is of course unavailable.59 However, if it were
said that the Sony doctrine should never have
any application beyond the narrow fact-pattern
of product manufacture or distribution, such a
contention would be troubling in four respects
at least.
First, as mentioned above, the Napster
court went to great lengths to ascertain the dis-
tinction between contributory infringement
and vicarious liability, noting "that Sony's 'staple
article of commerce' analysis has no applica-
tion to Napster's potential liability for vicarious
copyright infringement."6" However, "on-go-
ing control" is not an intrinsic consideration in
the context of contributory infringement, but
is traditionally seen as one of the two prongs
for vicarious liability.61 By extending this vi-
carious liability prong into the arena of contribu-
tory infringement, the Napster court appeared
to cause the sort of confusion it had tried to
warn against and prevent.
Second, this "on-going control" test is
exactly the same as the depiction in the classic
indirect trademark infringement case of Inwood
Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc.62 How-
ever, the Supreme Court in Sony explicitly re-
jected the analogy of indirect trademark in-
fringement by saying that "given the funda-
mental differences between copyright law and
trademark law, in this copyright case we do not
look to the standard for contributory infringe-
ment set forth in
"The Supreme Court made itclear that copyright
monopolies could not be
unduly extended to block the
'wheels of commerce. "
This approach of the service/product di-
chotomy does have some merit,5 8 to the extent
that it correctly indicates that Sony might not
be an excuse for active participation in infring-
ing activities; such participation often takes the
form of continuing service. In many cases, ac-
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the Supreme
Court.
Third, one can hardly draw a clear line
between service and product by the criterion
of "on-going control." In many events, a "ser-
vice" provider, despite the retention of a theo-
retical right to terminate consumer access to its
service, may act even more passively than a
"product" provider, and vice versa. For ex-
Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment Law & Practice347
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ample, while you may safely characterize power
supply as a service and water supply as a prod-
uct, how can you determine which provider
would have more control? Arguably, even Sony
could also exercise considerable control over
VTRs by installing a jamming system to con-
trol recording or simply keeping its products
off the market, both of which were actually
projected by the plaintiffs but rejected by the
district court in Sony.64 In terms of computer
software technologies, courts have long
struggled with the difficulty in classifying them
either as freestanding products or as on-going
services. 65 Especially upon the arrival of the
Internet, whether software is freestanding or
under the on-going control of the author/owner
depends merely on whether it is hooked
online. 66 In short, the dichotomy of service/
product may add more confusion than guid-
ance to the already muddy rules of the Sony
doctrine.
Finally, in cyberspace, classifying digi-
tal technologies as services or products will only
lead to two extremes. On one end is the boom
of decentralized software applications like
Gnutella and Freenet.67 To avoid any "on-go-
ing control," providers of such technologies cut
off any contact with consumers upon delivery.
The products are presented as pure products
without any central server, without technical
support, and even without after-sale service.
However, in the long run, consumers will en-
counter more difficulty in seeking reliable soft-
ware providers. On the other end is the chill-
ing scenario that no digital technology evades
the doom of being considered an on-going ser-
vice. As described above, in order to preclude
copyright liabilities, technology providers are
forced to intervene with private content distri-
butions, which drives consumers' interests
largely out of the picture.
68
C. Is Actual or Constructive
Knowledge Relevant to the
Sony Doctrine?
The appellate court in Napster, quoting
Netcom, 69 stated: "We observe that [the
defendant]'s actual, specific knowledge of di-
rect infringement renders Sony's holding of lim-
ited assistance to [the defendant]," 70 and "we
agree that if a computer system operator learns
of specific infringing material available on its
system and fails to purge such material from
the system, the operator knows of and contrib-
utes to direct infringement." 71 In effect, this
holding inserted a "lack of actual knowledge"
element into the Sony doctrine, irrespective of
any substantial noninfringing use. Thus,
Napster transforms the Sony doctrine, which
denies any indirect copyright liability if the ac-
cused technology is "merely ... capable of sub-
stantial noninfringing uses,"'72 into a rebuttable
presumption that simply places a notice re-
quirement on the plaintiff.
It is questionable whether one can read
out of the Sony opinion such an intention to
associate the application of "substantial
noninfringing uses" with the "knowledge"
prong in contributory infringement. 73 One can
hardly imagine that Sony would have been held
liable if it proceeded to engage in the VTR busi-
ness upon receipt of notice from copyright
holders.74 In the Sony opinion, the Supreme
Court never elaborated on actual knowledge
or any other prong of vicarious liability or con-
tributory infringement. This may indicate that,
as many commentators 75 and the district court
in Napster76 assent, the Supreme Court only
intended the Sony doctrine to be an affirmative
defense to any indirect copyright liability in-
stead of some evidential instrumentality. Even
if all three requirements for either contributory
infringement or vicarious liability were met, a
technology provider would nevertheless be free
from liability for offering the technology ca-
pable of substantial noninfringing uses. 77 To
the contrary, some lower courts properly inter-
pret the Sony doctrine as an affirmative defense.
For instance, in Vault Corporation v. Quaid Soft-
ware Limited,78 the Fifth Circuit quoted the Sony
case in holding that a software manufacturer
was not liable for contributory infringement on
the basis that the accused infringing program
could also be used to make archive copies as
plainly allowed under the Copyright Act.79 The
court reached this conclusion in spite of the fact
that the manufacturer explicitly conceded that
it had actual knowledge that its products were
used to make unauthorized copies of copy-
righted material."s
Another problem with the "actual
knowledge" analysis is whether receipt of no-
tice from copyright holders can be equal to tech-
nology providers' actual knowledge.81 As the
Spring 2005 348
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court in Netcom admitted, even after the Internet
service providers had received actual notice
from copyright holders of a particular allegedly
infringing activity, such knowledge was insuf-
ficient for contributory infringement where the
providers could not "reasonably verify a claim
of infringement, either because of a possible fair
use defense, the lack of copyright notices on
the copies, or the copyright holder's failure to
provide the necessary documentation to show
that there is a likely infringement."82 Besides,
it would be naYve of a court to preclude the
possibility that copyright holders may mali-
ciously assert false information, say, for the pur-
pose of intervening others' business operations.
When copyright holders' notice is inconsistent
with the truth, technology providers as a mat-
ter of fact receive no actual knowledge upon
receipt of notice. It appears that, absent such
complicated notice and take-down procedures
as described in the Digital Millennium Copy-
right Act ("DMCA") safe harbors,83 the "actual
knowledge" approach could incur many con-
troversies while being implemented.
D. What Does It Mean to be
Capable of Substantial
Noninfringing Uses?
The Sony doctrine largely hinges on the mean-
ing of "capable of substantial noninfringing
uses." 84 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court
failed to provide a clear-cut definition of that
phrase in the Sony opinion. One may only find
some clues in its uses of other terminology ap-
parently describing the same thing: "capable
of commercially significant noninfringing
uses" 85 and when "a significant number of [uses
of the product] would be noninfringing." 6






think of varied technologies as falling along a
continuum ranging from those having only in-
fringing uses to those having only legitimate
uses. If all technologies appear on the two ends
of the continuum, we will have little difficulty
in defining their legal statuses. In reality, most
innovative technologies will have a place some-
where in the middle, having both legitimate
and illegitimate uses. To draw the line between
the two extremes, courts and commentators
conceived of many options. The following four
are normally deemed as representative.
87
1. Primarily Used for Infring-
ing Purposes
The district court in Napster held that
fair uses of a file-sharing technology were "not
substantial enough to preclude indirectly liabil-
ity" when the traffic to its website resulted
chiefly from the technology's ability to assist
copyright infringement.8 In addition, the court
rejected an obvious noninfringing use as irrel-
evant under the Sony doctrine because it was
an afterthought that was not launched until the
plaintiffs filed the suit.89 In sum, if an Internet
technology is primarily used for infringing pur-
poses at the time of the lawsuit, none of its emerg-
ing or future noninfringing uses could be con-
sidered commercially significant. 90
This approach appears to be a very re-
strictive reading of the Sony doctrine, as it ar-
guably inserts an unusual timing requirement
that did not exist in the original Sony holdings. 91
Taken literally, the wording "capable of substan-
tial noninfringing uses" (emphasis added) in-
stead of "currently used for substantial
noninfringing uses" indicates that the Supreme
Court intended the Sony doctrine to be a for-
ward-looking flexible test. In applying this doc-
trine, courts are
required to con-
ouds ofsider the full
technical capa-
ill coerce bility and mar-
ket potential of a
roviders to new technol-
ogy. 92 Accord-
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the current and future uses of the technology,
regardless of whether they are pre-existing, an
afterthought, or even non-existing at the time
of lawsuit. To otherwise arbitrarily curb the
test at any given time, courts would run the
risk of depriving many innovative technologies






used by some I "... 'on-goingintrinsic coirnntfvf
consumers.93
To put infringementan end to the
chaos sparked seen as one c
by the "prima- k lia
rily used for in- vicarious liah
fringing pur-
poses" ap-
proach,94 the appellate court in Napster explic-
itly rejected the district court's reasoning and
criticized its analysis for "ignoring the system's
capabilities" and "plac[ing] undue weight on
the proportion of current infringing use as com-
pared to current and future noninfringing
use."
95
2. Substantial Infringing Use
Addressing the Sony doctrine, Profes-
sor Goldstein advocated that "courts should..
• apply a comparative, rather than an absolute,
measure in determining whether an infringing
use is substantial, and should hold the defen-
dant [liable] for infringement only if the infring-
ing uses of its material or equipment are sub-
stantial as compared to their noninfringing
uses." 96 The essence of his proposal is to com-
pare all the potential uses for infringing and
noninfringing purposes, then determine which
one is predominant in quantity and/or in sig-
nificance. To the extent that this approach does
not freeze the Sony test with any artificial tim-
ing, it has manifest superiority over the "pri-
marily used for noninfringing purposes" ap-
proach.
However, this approach appears to have
its own difficulties. First, in such a fast-grow-
ing area as the Internet, 97 any prediction on
whether an emerging technology will later turn
out to be predominantly infringing would be
highly speculative, if not entirely impossible.
It is particularly true that the judiciary, limited
by its constitutional authority, is notoriously ill-
equipped to make any technical or business
judgment with a profound impact on social
interests beyond the confines of the court-
room.98 As a result, this difficulty in applica-
control' is not an
nsideration in the
:)f contributory
, but is traditionally
f the two prongs for
ility."'
tion could add much uncertainty, inconsistency,
and unpredictability to the Sony doctrine.
Secondly, this approach is in effect
analogous to the dissenting opinion in the Sony
case.99 The majority in Sony explicitly held that
"in order to resolve that question [of substan-
tial noninfringing uses], we need not explore
all the different potential uses of the machine
and determine whether or not they would con-
stitute infringement."' 100 The majority also
quoted the district court, stating, "[w]hatever
the future percentage of legal versus illegal
home-use recording might be, an injunction
which seeks to deprive the public of the very
tool or article of commerce capable of some
noninfringing use would be an extremely harsh
remedy, as well as one unprecedented in copy-
right law."' 0 ' These holdings signal the Su-
preme Court's preference to weigh all the po-
tential noninfringing uses of a technology in
isolation, not in comparison to its other infring-
ing uses.
Thirdly, the "staple article of commerce"
theory in the patent context, in which the Sony
doctrine is deeply rooted, implicates a rather
low threshold for "substantial noninfringing
uses." Patent cases generally find a technology
capable of substantial noninfringing uses, un-
less it is "unsuited for any commercial
noninfringing use" or has "no use except
through practice of the patent method."
10 2
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Furthermore, the Supreme Court based its
finding of substantial noninfringing uses alter-
natively and sufficiently on authorized time-
shifting uses, which only accounted for 7.3%
of total uses.10 3 This also suggests that even a
minority use of a technology may be "substan-
tial" enough for the purpose of the Sony doc-
trine. 104
3. Staple Article of Commerce
Many cases after the Sony decision have
attempted to narrow its holdings to specific
facts only concerning "staple articles of com-
merce." For example, one court indicated that
"the Sony doctrine only applies to 'staple ar-
ticles or commodities of commerce,' such as
VCRs, photocopiers, and blank, standard-
length cassette tapes. Its protection would not
extend to products specifically manufactured
for counterfeiting activity, even if such prod-
ucts have substantial noninfringing uses."105' In
other words, "staple article of commerce" con-
stitutes a new prong for the Sony doctrine in
addition to "capable of substantial noninfringing
uses.,
This proposal will meet with an obvi-
ous problem of eggs and chickens. When a
new technology comes out, it is only a fancy
machine that people know very little about,
with an unpredictable fate in the courtroom as
well as the marketplace. If the technology is
later held to be an infringing article, it would
probably be eliminated from the market and
never have the opportunity to grow into a staple
article of commerce. Only if it enjoys shelter
from fatal legal claims can it possibly enter into
the mainstream of commerce. When this
"staple article of commerce" approach requires
us to first determine its market status and then,
based on that, determine its legal status, courts
may find themselves in an endless circle of rea-
soning.
4. Independent Justification of
Noninfringing use
Professor Dogan proposed that being "capable
of substantial noninfringing uses" for purposes
of the Sony doctrine should mean that the
noninfringing use alone would justify the de-
velopment and distribution of the product; oth-
erwise the public is not being deprived of a
neutral staple, but of a product that is made
possible solely by infringement. 16 This ap-
proach seems to make the most sense since it
corresponds to the Supreme Court's objective
to protect the legitimate interest of "substan-
tially unrelated areas of commerce." 107 If a tech-
nology cannot possibly achieve any commer-
cial significance independent of its infringing
use, it should not be qualified as an unrelated
area of commerce. However, if the
noninfringing use alone can still justify the de-
velopment or exploitation of the technology,
such technology should be deemed to be
among the "useful arts" promoted by the Con-
gress.1
08
This approach has actually been ap-
plauded by several federal courts, which con-
cluded that if a product had little likelihood of
market success based solely on the
noninfringing use, its provider should not es-
cape indirect copyright liability of the infring-
ing uses. 9 The Sony case itself, on one occa-
sion, also seemed to imply this approach by stat-
ing that when the authorized uses of VTRs are
in such a significant number as to "create a sub-
stantial market for a noninfringing use ... the
legitimacy of that market is not [to be] com-
promised." 110
One may argue that this approach will
allow a new technology to be marketed even if
it has substantial infringing uses. The technol-
ogy provider would then be able to derive prof-
its not only from its own contributions to the
technology, but also from some unauthorized
uses of copyrighted works of authorship."' This
is tantamount to compelling authors to subsi-
dize the information technology industry. How-
ever, such an unfortunate sacrifice appears to
be unavoidable as a necessary social cost to
stimulate technology innovations. To stipulate
otherwise, authors would conversely capture
involuntary subsidies from a technology's
noninfringing uses such as copying public do-
main works. 1 12 The more substantial the
noninfringing uses are, the more impediments
such subsidization would create to the technol-
ogy. In the face of the dilemma between full
protection of authors' interests and availability
of substantially unrelated technologies, many
courts are prone to resolve the tension in favor
of technological innovation.1 3
Moreover, absolving some technology
providers from indirect copyright liability does
not mean that copyright holders are totally de-
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void of remedies for the unlawful copying their
works via those technologies. They may seek
deterrence of direct infringements with the aid
of other enforcement strategies, such as en-
hanced criminal penalties 14 and technological
self-help.
1 5
III. Why Is the Sony Doctrine Still
Relevant in the Digital Age?
One may argue that the advent of digital tech-
nology and the Internet has drastically revolu-
tionized the landscape of information genera-
tion and flow. Accordingly, most traditional
copyright doctrines, which largely aimed to
cope with out-of-date analog media problems,
seem archaic in the digital age. 116 During the
last decade, the Copyright Act experienced
numerous modifications, including the enact-













come into play side-by-side with the DMCA
safe harbors.
The DMCA safe harbors hardly bear any
superiority over the Sony doctrine, let alone pre-
empt it. The first two safe harbors, for "transi-
tory digital network communications" 121 and
"system caching," 122 seem to be of little assis-
tance to the technology providers addressed in
this Article, as they mainly engage in software
developments. By definition, these two safe
harbors were aimed to protect providers of
Internet hardware infrastructures such as wires,
circuits, or servers.
The other two safe harbors123 may
squarely apply to certain software technology
providers, yet they are to a great extent only
illusory in the context of indirect copyright li-
ability. To qualify for these two safe harbors,
among other things, a service provider, (1) must
not have actual knowledge that the material or
"Especially upon the arrival of
Internet, whether software is
freestanding or under the on-
going control of the author/owner
depends merely on whether it is
hooked online or not"
three reasons
why the aging
Sony doctrine should retain its vitality.
A. The DMCA Does Not Su-
persede the Sony Doctrine
The DMCA provides four safe harbors
for so-called "service providers.""18 Comply-
ing with the requirements of a safe harbor will
purportedly absolve a service provider of any
direct or indirect copyright liability."9 At the
same time, the DMCA stipulates, "The failure
of a service provider's conduct to qualify for
limitation of liability under this section shall not
bear adversely upon the consideration of a de-
fense by the service provider that the service
provider's conduct is not infringing under this
title or any other defense." 120 In other words,
the DMCA does not preempt any traditional
copyright defense. Thus, the Sony doctrine may
activity is infringing and not be aware of facts
or circumstances from which infringing activ-
ity is apparent, and (2) must not receive a fi-
nancial benefit directly attributable to the in-
fringing activity, in a case in which the service
provider has right and ability to control such
activity.'24 Astonishingly, the first requirement
is just one of the prongs for contributory in-
fringement; the second requirement includes
both prongs of vicarious liability.25 A service
provider will be sheltered from indirect copy-
right liability only if it is actually not liable for
any indirect copyright liability in the first place.
The above analyses illustrate an irony
in that, although technology providers as well
as copyright holders fought hard for the pas-
sage of the DMCA, most of the digital copy-
right cases still call for application of pre-DMCA
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copyright regimes such as the Sony doctrine. 126
B. Sony Has Proven to be a
Wise Win-Win Decision
As mentioned above, to many copy-
right holders' despair, the Supreme Court in
Sony opted to foster the unfettered develop-
ment and commercialization of new technol-
ogy as an effort to strike the balance between
effective copyright protection and freedom of















nine and a half
billion dollars since Sony.1 28 Moreover, movie
studios found themselves with a new and enor-
mously profitable channel of distribution, made
possible entirely by the widespread introduc-
tion of VTRs. In the late 1990s, the rentals and
sales of video cassettes exceeded six million units
each year. 29 In this sense, the wisdom of the
Sony doctrine actually gave birth to two dy-
namic new industries: the home electronic in-
dustry for technology providers and the home
entertainment industry for copyright holders.
Internet technologies, such as BBS and
peer-to-peer file sharing, definitely have the
potential to grow into digital versions of VTR.
Although the copyright industry tends to de-
pict many Internet technologies as piracy ha-
vens and authors' worst nightmares, probably
as a courtroom strategy, such technologies may
turn out to confer substantial benefits on au-
thors and other copyright holders.130 For ex-
ample, Internet technologies open new market
horizons for alternative or young artists by
making their works available to millions of con-
sumers without relying on mainstream chan-
nels such as major record labels or publishing
houses.13' Even established artists may also gain
a greater share of copyright revenues, while
direct Internet communications between art-
ists and consumers diminish the market power
of intermediaries. 132 Moreover, authors and
copyright owners would generally be able to
eliminate vast marginal costs associated with
traditional hard copy distribution, such as trans-
portation, storage and display costs.
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What makes the Sony doctrine most sig-
nificant is that the judicial endorsement of tech-
nology innovations, whether last century's VTR
or more recently the Internet, will eventually
offer enormous benefits to the general public.
As the Supreme Court articulated in Sony as
well as on numerous other occasions, in order
to fulfill the Constitution's objective, 34 copy-
right law must preserve the dedicate balance
between "the interest of the writer in the con-
trol and exploitation of his intellectual property
... and the competing interest of society in the
untrammeled dissemination of ideas.' ' 35 It is
even repeatedly asserted that copyright law
merely "makes reward to the owner a second-
ary consideration," and that "the sole interest
of the United States and the primary object in
conferring the copyright monopoly lies in the
general benefits derived by the public from the
labors of authors."'136 Liberating information
technology from overstretched copyright liabil-
ity will notably increase the likelihood of build-
ing a decentralized communications infrastruc-
ture and promoting the public interests in free
flow of information. 137 Traditional mass me-
dia, like journalism or television, entail substan-
tial financial resources that only a limited num-
ber of entrepreneurial intermediaries can af-
ford. As the Internet and other digital tech-
nologies dramatically lower the threshold costs
for public communication, they enable indi-
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vidual consumers to communicate information
directly to the general public. In this sense,
average people gain more realistic opportuni-
ties to participate in social discourse and fully
exercise their freedom of speech. Consequently,
digital technologies enormously augment the
quantity and diversity of information available
to the public, in that multiple information
sources are substituted for the bottleneck cre-
ated by conventional intermediaries. 138 Yet, an
overbroad copyright regime may perpetuate
the information bottleneck and diminish the
social benefits brought by decentralized com-
munications in cyberspace. For instance, un-
due expansion of indirect copyright liability
would have a chilling effect on technology pro-
viders.139 As a result, technology providers
would be compelled to censor too much infor-
mation flow on the Internet and would become
a new generation of centralized intermediaries.
In addition to thwarting information produc-
tion, over-censorship would result in high op-
eration costs associated with online services,
which consequently would inflate the price of
information access to the general public.
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In a nutshell, the lasting vitality of the
Sony doctrine lies in its particular mindfulness
of the delicate balance between authors' inter-
ests in control and exploitation of their intellec-
tual creations, unfettered technology innova-
tions in means of dissemination, and the ulti-
mate public interest in the free flow of infor-
mation.141 In increasingly frequent confronta-
tion with novel copyright issues generated by
emerging technologies, modern courts can still
learn from the wisdom of the Sony doctrine and
its underlying win-win philosophy.
In addition to establishment of the Sony
doctrine, another significant contribution of the
Sony case is that it provided compelling strate-
gic teachings for courts facing the challenge of
a new technology. The Supreme Court repeat-
edly counseled that,
Congress has the constitutional author-
ity and the institutional ability to accom-
modate fully the varied permutations of
competing interests that are inevitably
implicated by such new technology...
The judiciary's reluctance to expand the
protections afforded by the copyright
without explicit legislative guidance is a
recurring theme ... Sound policy, as
well as history, supports out consistent
deference to Congress when major tech-
nological innovations alter the market
for copyrighted materials.
42
The judiciary's conservative role in rec-
onciling copyright and technology develop-
ments rests on policy reasons beyond the canon
of stare decisis. As the Restatement of Unfair
Competition notes, rule-making in intellectual
property law is best left to legislation because
of the area's inherent intricacy and subtlety.
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For instance, any rule-making initiative to ex-
pand exclusive rights must begin with an in-
vestigation of whether the current legal regime
has already caused underproduction in infor-
mation. 44 One must then ascertain whether
any alternatives exist, such as contracts or en-
cryption, with which producers may utilize self-
help measures to cure the problem. 45 Third,
assessment of possible legal impacts on tech-
nological innovations requires sophisticated un-
derstanding of the various technology issues
that are involved. The above investigations
could be so time-consuming and prohibitively
expensive that any court could hardly afford to
carry them out during relatively short periods
of individual actions.1 46 Moreover, expansion
of property rights in information may affect a
wide variety of interest groups, including edu-
cational entities, libraries, research institutes, and
even governmental bodies. Therefore, to ac-
commodate all the competing interests to the
greatest extent, rule-makers must establish a
forum for wide social discourses. Because the
disputes in action are usually narrowed between
parties in the courtroom, courts systematically
tend to overlook interests outside the courtroom
and potential costs to society as a whole.147 In
light of those institutional limitations in the ju-
diciary, self-empowered rule-makings will add
to the uncertainty of law and jeopardize the
integrity of legal system.
Ultimately, a cautious lower court that
is confronted with thorny problems imposed
by new technologies should not harshly extend
the statutory copyright monopoly to stifle the
technological innovation, but should preserve
the balance achieved by statutes and precedents
between the competing interests of encourag-
ing copyright holders and furthering the pub-
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lic welfare. Until the Sony case is overruled by
the Supreme Court or by a legislative instru-
ment,148 a lower court should faithfully follow
the holdings of the Sony case and be mindful
of its constitutional role in the legal system.
IV. Conclusion
Copyright law history has witnessed the
emergence of an endless line of technologies
that facilitate more efficient reproduction, ma-
nipulation, and dissemination of copyrighted
works of authorship. In the past, piano rolls,
149
cable television, 150 photocopiers,15 ' VTRs,'15 and
MP3 players 15 3 all sparked much debate on
their formidable threats to meaningful copy-
right protection. In each instance, however,
courts managed to assimilate the new technol-
ogy into the existing legal framework, often cre-
ating an unexpected but lucrative avenue of
profits for copyright holders. 54 The wisdom
of these successful cases lies, inter alia, in its
particular attentiveness to the inherent balance
in copyright law -the balance between authors'
interests in control and exploitation of their in-
tellectual creations and the unfettered technol-
ogy innovations in means of dissemination and
the ultimate public interest in free flow of in-
formation.
As the Sony doctrine is undoubtedly
among the best reflections of the balancing
philosophy in copyright law, this Article sug-
gests that courts should give it the utmost re-
spect. To reestablish the Sony doctrine in an
unambiguous and consistent way, Congress
may consider codifying the doctrine alongside
the DMCA safe harbors. Alternatively, the Su-
preme Court may refresh and further clarify
the Sony doctrine to curb the chaotic applica-
tions of lower courts. The essence of the Sony
doctrine should at least include the following
maxims or guidelines:
A. It applies to both contributory
infringement and vicarious liability;
B. It applies to both service provid-
ers and product providers;
C. It is an affirmative defense for in-
direct copyright liability instead of a re-
buttable presumption;
D. "Capable of substantial
noninfringing uses" should mean that
the noninfringing uses would alone jus-
tify the development and distribution
of the product; and
E. Its policy underpinning is to
strike a balance between a copyright
holder's legitimate demand for effective,
not merely symbolic, protection of the
statutory monopoly, and the rights of
others to freely engage in substantially
unrelated areas of commerce.
Of course, this Article is not an attempt
to foreclose further debates on the validity and
interpretation of the Sony doctrine. Arguably,
more evidence will soon emerge showing that
the fast growth of information technologies has
outstripped the Sony doctrine, or that the Sony
doctrine is not the right place to draw the copy-
right balance between competing social inter-
ests. Nevertheless, even if the time finally
comes to declare the Sony doctrine an anachro-
nism in cyberspace, it should be Congress that
informs the judiciary-not vice versa.
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